before they are granted a residency permit. In order to obtain official documents, immigrants now have to agree to be fingerprinted, suggesting that the state regards all immigrants as potential criminals. Implementing the 'zero-tolerance' platform adopted by Silvio Berlusconi during his successful campaign to become prime minister several years ago, the Italian government has made it far more easy to expel immigrants, has toughened punishments for immigrants who break the law, and has imposed stiff penalties for immigrant smugglers (Renaud 2002) . The rights of legal immigrants, who are now tied to their employers by the threat of deportation should they lose their jobs, are also dramatically curtailed by this law. The Bossi-Fini law has, in other words, helped place 2 Although a shared sense of European identity and the institutions to legitimate that identity remain notoriously difficult to consolidate, it has proven far easier to forge a common conception of those who do not belong. Yet even in this regard the heterogeneity of notions of belonging in particular nations and regions cannot be overlooked. While it is important to note the similarities that link different expressions of racism throughout 'Fortress
Europe,' such racism can only be combated effectively if its specific constituents are noted on a national and sub-national scale. Such an approach is particularly essential in Italy, where strong traditions of regional autonomy and inequality offer an inescapable background for discussions of immigration. Indeed, the complexities and contradictions in Italy's history of nation-formation make it a particularly volatile site when it comes to the contemporary controversies raging around definitions of collective identity and citizenship.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Italy's political establishment intensified the specificity and heterogeneity of Italian politics during the 1990s. When immigration from Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, and places further afield increased in these years, mobilization for and against immigrants' rights in Italy took on an extremely localized character. As in other parts of Europe, Italian anti-immigrant groups tended to mobilize in the name of law and order and the 'defense of the native born' (Della Porta 2000, 121 ). Yet as the corrupt character of the post-war nation-state in Italy became more apparent as a result of scandals like 'Tangentopoli', anti-racist activists revived regional traditions which challenged the facile equation of nation and belonging that has animated popular racism in Northern European countries such as Britain (Gilroy 1987, 43) .
Reflecting the collapse of the Christian Democrats and the fragmentation of the left during the 1990s, such anti-racist movements also tended to be relatively independent of established political parties and institutions. Recovering the Hybrid History of the Mezzogiorno
Racism was a problem in Italy long before the arrival of significant groups of extra-communitari in the 1990s. As John Dickie has argued, the Mezzogiorno, the underdeveloped southern portion of Italy that is often seen as beginning at Rome, provided a source of stereotypes against which the nation as a whole defined itself following unification in the mid-nineteenth century (1999, 1) . At the time of national unification, the South was politically under-represented and consequently suffered disproportionately from injurious economic and social programs put in place by the new liberal regime. As happened in many colonized regions, the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment was blamed on the supposedly uncivilized character of its inhabitants (Dickie 1999, 3) . Residents of the southern half of the Italian peninsula were seen as more African than European. It is ironic, then, that Mussolini was to argue during the fascist period for colonization of the horn of Africa and Libya as a solution to the chronic poverty and under-employment that beset the South. Italy, however, lacked the resources for the kind of settler colonialism pursued by major European powers like Britain and
France. As a result, a minuscule percentage of Italy's population actually settled in Africa during the colonial years. In addition, the colonial project failed to provide a solution to the problems of the Mezzogiorno (Palumbo 2003, 20) . Indeed, after 1945, the Mezzogiorno displaced Africa as the prime site for the articulation of national anxieties.
As a result, the broader Mediterranean world of which Italy forms a part, a regional identity that the fascist regime had foregrounded in its colonial rhetoric, largely ceased to be a subject of public attention and debate.
The political and economic subordination of the Mezzogiorno following unification produced a set of unique conditions, making Italy not only the country of the largest European mass emigration, but also catalyzing a substantial internal mass migration during the post-1945 period (King and Andall 1999, 135) . When the industrialized cities of Northern Italy went through an economic upswing during the late 1950s and 1960s, national attention focused on the question of how to deal with the supposedly pathological characteristics of the Mezzogiorno and of the southern migrants who were being drawn north by the boom. Economic refugees arriving in industrialized cities of the North such as Turin and Milan experienced severe forms of social and economic discrimination. Such prejudice was generated in many cases by the continuing circulation of racial stereotypes concerning the 'barbarous' denizens of the Mezzogiorno (Foot 1999, 161) . While marked by substantial regional variation, many of Northern Italy's cities remain polarized by these sub-national geographies of race and belonging.
Adding to this complex history of internal discrimination, the industrialized regions of the North as well as southern cities like Naples and Palermo are now the destination for immigrants from many different underdeveloped nations and regions, making Italy one of Southern Europe's most significant 'frontier states' (Melotti 1997, 85 (Mitchell 1996, 143) .
The aim of these pioneers was to create an engaged and locally responsive musical culture that could hold its own against the apparently monolithic force of American Posse underline the colonial politics that lie behind phobic representations of the other.
Having introduced this challenge to complacent European identity, the band then dares the fictional bourgeois subject they have created to kill the immigrant who disgusts him.
The repeated goading injunction to shoot makes the stakes behind even commonplace forms of racial antipathy quite clear. At this point in the song, the identificatory patterns suddenly shift, and the singer, who has declared his unity with the bourgeois subject by saying 'we're beautiful and they're ugly,' reveals that he too is an immigrant. The smug sense of complicity that has been fostered throughout the rest of the song is thus dramatically shattered. The listener suddenly has to decide whose side s/he is on. [Those who support these racist laws know that there will be an increase in the number of 'illegals'…It will be ever more difficult to enter Italy legally: the more an individual is blackmailed, the more s/he will be willing to work for a pittance -Nsongan.
-Che cosa fai qua?
-Suono il tamburo.
-Ale si a sunè il tamburu.
-E con che suoni, con I negretti della tua tribù?
-Il mio gruppo si chiama MAU MAU.
-E bene, I ritmi dei selvaggi. -Nsongan.
-What're you doing here?
-I play the drums.
-Hear that, he's here to play the drums! And who do you play with, the little black kids of your tribe?
-My group is called MAU MAU.
-Oh, the rhythms of the savages! Well, get on with your display of folklore and then go home.
-Actually, we sing in Piedmontese dialect, This form of global apartheid helps maintain the system of differential labor costs that is fundamental to maximizing profit levels (Wallerstein 2002 Struggles over place, George Lipsitz has written, are the specific form in which contemporary social crises occur (1994, 3) . Over the last decade it has become a truism that the static boundaries of place and identity imposed by the modern nation-state are being dissolved or at least severely eroded by complex transnational flows of capital, culture, commodities, and communities. Our language for understanding social identities and their transformation has taken on an increasingly geographical and even hydraulic vocabulary as borders seemed to collapse in the face of the post-Fordist economy's myriad forms of mobility. A close examination of changes in the European Union's immigration legislation over the last quarter century suggests that such notions of mobility need to be heavily qualified.
In 1968, an EEC agreement established a two-tiered framework for the work force within Europe. This meant that the citizens of member states would be free to travel throughout the community in search of work while so-called guestworkers, many of whom had been residents of particular European states for many years by that point, would remain trapped in their 'host' countries (Webber 1991, 12) . As the economic slump of the 1970s began to take effect, the few avenues of legal immigration that had been available during the preceding period of labor shortage were closed. Asylum seekers and other refugees were placed by EU governments in detention centers and attacked by neo-fascist parties in national media as leeches and terrorists. As Mediterranean states such as Spain, Greece, and Italy, which were once significant labor exporters, started to boom economically, they inevitably began to attract immigration flows from less harsh immigration laws and policies were drafted by ministers and police chiefs during the early 1990s that ensured the political impotence of the workers in this new economy (Sivanandan 1993, 69 ). In Fortress Europe, then, mobility is for the privileged. It is no accident that contemporary Italian hip hop culture deals so explicitly with issues of racism. The tradition of autonomia from which Italian centri sociali developed is predicated on an embrace of extra-parliamentary politics and social movements (Hardt 1996, 5 Italian youth culture since they affirm connections with a broader world in the context of an increasingly insular official European identity. Undeniably, the racialized institutional framework of Fortress Europe threatens to legitimate and catalyze the same kinds of neofascist racism in Italy that are all too evident across Northern Europe. Yet the 'contaminated' work of the posses testifies to a grassroots anti-racist movement that has had a substantial impact on youth culture in Italy over the last decade. The cosmopolitan cultural forms and messages produced by contemporary contaminazione hold out the vision of an egalitarian, anti-racist, and social Europe that can be affirmed in the face of the European Union's increasing fortress mentality.
